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Abstract
The mechanism underlying banks’ interest rate setting behaviour is an important element
in the study of economic systems with important policy implications associated with the po-
tential of monetary and -recently- macroprudential policies to affect the real economy. In the
agent-based modelling literature, lending rate setting has so far been modelled in an ad-hoc
manner, based almost exclusively on theoretical grounds with the specifics usually chosen in
an arbitrary fashion. This study tries to empirically identify the mechanism that approximates
the observed patterns of consumer credit interest rates within a data-driven, agent-based model
(ABM). The analysis suggests that there is heterogeneity across countries, both in terms of the
rule itself as well as its specific parameters and that often a simple, borrower-risk only mecha-
nism adequately approximates the historical series. More broadly, the validation exercise shows
that the model is able to replicate the dynamics of several variables of interest, thus providing
a way to bring ABMs “close to the data”.
JEL classification: C63; E21; E27; E43
Keywords: Agent-based modelling, Lending rate mechanism, Consumer credit, Model vali-
dation, Rule discovery
“... you don’t know the rules of the game, but you’re allowed to look at
the board [...] and from these observations you try to figure out what
the rules of the game are, what the rules of the pieces moving are.”
Richard P. Feynman1
1 Introduction
The primary, empirical topic of this study is the investigation of the interest rate setting mechanism
for consumer credit. Essentially, it tries to answer the question: “Which rule better approximates
∗I would like to thank Marija Drenkovska, Malgorzata Mitka, Elisa Reinhold and internal Bank of Slovenia seminar
participants for useful comments and suggestions. The views (and, of course, any errors) are mine and should not
be attributed to the aforementioned individuals or institution.
Email: gpapad.gr@gmail.com
1“The Rules of the Game” in The pleasure of finding things out. Helix Books, 1999
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banks’ interest rate setting in a country-specific, data-driven agent-based model?” In a more funda-
mental level, it describes an attempt to discover the agent-specific rule which yields a close match
between the simulated and historical timeseries.
The literature in agent-based modelling (ABM)2 in Economics has evolved significantly over
time, moving from the development of abstract models to elaborate descriptions of economic systems
and phenomena providing very insightful contributions along the way.
In macroeconomic ABMs in particular, a large body of research can be grouped into a few
main model families (Dawid and Delli Gatti, 2018). These models have been very successful in
describing various aspects of the macroeconomy from the bottom-up and matching emergent pat-
terns and stylized facts. Nevertheless, the ABM literature has so far focused, almost exclusively, on
the replication of empirical regularities without being able to reproduce the evolution of observed
timeseries. Indeed, matching real-world timeseries is a challenging task (Farmer and Foley, 2009)
which only a handful of studies have managed to accomplish so far.3
One such study is from Delli Gatti et al. (2011) where the authors employ data from about
25,000 Italian firms in the period 1998-2002 to develop an ABM. Their validation exercise reveals
a very good fit between the simulated and observed timeseries of firms’ average interest rate of
debt. Another study, focusing on the housing market, is from Geanakoplos et al. (2012). Based
on data from 2.2 million households in Washington, DC during the period 1997-2010 manages to
replicate the temporal evolution of several housing market indices. The third related study is a
detailed ABM of the Austrian economy by Poledna et al. (2020). Using data from Eurostat for the
period 1997Q1-2010Q1, compares favourably to its VAR and DSGE counterparts in out-of-sample
forecasts of several macroeconomic aggregates. Finally, the study of Papadopoulos (2019) takes
an alternative approach. Instead of a fully-fledged macroeconomic ABM, the author uses publicly
available data from 2000-2018 and injects them into a small-scale ABM as a proxy of agents’
interactions. The simulated output fits very well the historical series of household consumption and
consumer credit for a number of countries.
This paper employs the latter approach to investigate the underlying mechanism which could
possibly give rise to a certain, observed macro-pattern. In particular, a series which was used in
the original model as an input, is replaced by an endogenous, agent-specific rule.4 The idea behind
the replacement of an input series is that if all but one element in the model follow their historical
paths, then one can investigate which rule yields the most adequate approximation of the replaced
series. This is done in the context of banks’ consumer credit interest rate setting mechanism.5
In the ABM literature, interest rate setting is largely modelled in an ad-hoc manner (for an
overview, see Table 7 in Appendix A and references therein). Nevertheless, there are some broad,
common features among them. Typically, the charged interest rate is expressed as mark-up on a
baseline rate, usually the policy rate of the central bank. Another common characteristic is that,
with the exception of ABMs focusing on the housing market, the predominant loan type modelled
is uncollateralised credit to firms.
With regard to the exact interest rate setting rule, in spite of the study-specific heterogeneity,
four main mechanism groups can be distinguished. The first group treats the interest rate either
2In the paper, the “M” in the term ABM refers either to the modelling approach or a model itself.
3For a recent review of the advances in ABM validation and calibration, including a comparison of several
calibration methods’ performance, the work of Platt (2020) is an excellent reference.
4In this study both terms rule and mechanism refer to the mathematical representation which approximates the
bank’s interest rate setting behaviour. The particular equations implemented are elaborated in subsection 2.3.4.
5The terms interest rate and lending rate will be used interchangeably for the rest of the study, referring to the
lending rate for uncollateralised consumer credit.
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as constant or as a fixed mark-up on the baseline rate. This highly stylized mechanism leaves the
monetary policy as the sole determinant of the lending rate thus, isolating it from the borrowers’ and
the lenders’ financial conditions. The second group considers counterparty risk in the determination
of the interest rate. The most frequently used proxy for borrower creditworthiness is their leverage,
specified as a ratio of their total debt to some measure of their repayment ability such as their
disposable income (for households) or net worth or cash flow (for firms). An increasing function
of the chosen measure of borrower credit risk, on top of the baseline rate, defines the charged
interest rate and quantifies the link between the premium asked for and the associated risk of credit
supplied. Another mechanism group disregards borrower risk but incorporates lenders’ financial
health into the calculation of the interest rate. Since there are very few representatives of this type
of mechanism, it is difficult to identify a general pattern regarding this rule’s specifics. The final
mechanism group combines all previous elements; the policy rate, a borrower- and a lender-related
component. As before, these studies follow the consensus regarding the direction of the relationship
between the interest rate and borrower risk; the higher the potential risk, the higher the premium
required by the bank. The implementation of the bank-specific component varies across studies,
ranging from a simple, stochastically varying term (proxying operational costs) to behavioural rules
based on the bank’s ability to lend all possible funds. The most frequent approach, though, is to
link the interest rate with the lender’s financial soundness via a decreasing function; i.e. the higher
the net worth or the lower the leverage (in terms of total loans to equity share) of a lender, the lower
the interest rate charged and vice versa. Interestingly, in many studies the choice of the specific
functional form implemented is not thoroughly discussed and the associated parameters are usually
chosen in an arbitrary fashion.
The empirical literature on the subject provides some mixed evidence. On the one hand it is
reasonably established that the policy rate is the basis upon which banks’ interest rates are formed
(Freixas and Rochet, 2008). In addition, there is a general agreement about the positive relationship
of the latter with borrowers’ risk. On the other hand, the link between banks’ capital adequacy
(the ratio of capital plus reserves to total assets) is unclear. Some studies indicate a positive
(Baugnet and Hradisky, 2004; Valverde and Ferna´ndez, 2007; Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008;
Gambacorta, 2008), others a negative (Brock and Franken, 2003; Horva´th and Podpiera, 2012),
some an insignificant relationship (Almarzoqi and Naceur, 2015) and others even a state-dependent
one (Osborne et al., 2017). In addition to the previous studies, data from an online repository6
of studies from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (Boissay et al., 2019) show that the
majority of the literature suggests a non-negative impact of bank’s capital adequacy on lending
rates with only a few documenting a negative one.7
Combining the modelling choices from the ABM literature with the findings from the empirical
studies, this paper attempts to discover the rule that potentially underlies banks’ consumer credit
interest rate setting behaviour. Section 2 describes the model, its initialisation and mechanics while
section 3 the data used as an input. Section 4 presents and discusses the results and examines the
ability of the model to replicate the historical dynamics of several variables of interest. Finally,
section 5 concludes.
6https://stats.bis.org/frame/ [Accessed August 2020]
7From 16 studies, as of the latest update (March 2019), 38 from 41 estimates report a non-negative impact while
only 3 a negative one.
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2 The model
This section presents the structure of the model, providing a description of the agents and the rules
that govern their interactions in the various markets. The model closely follows the data-driven,
agent-based model developed in Papadopoulos (2019). It keeps most of the original model’s inner
workings as well as its data-driven nature unchanged, thus it retains its closeness to the observed
time series.
However, from a modelling perspective, it has a fundamental, structural extension; an endoge-
nous, behavioural rule replaces one of the input series. In particular, this study explores several
interest rate setting mechanisms to identify which one most adequately approximates the historical
series of consumer credit interest rates. The basic elements of the model and its extension are
elaborated below.
The most sophisticated agents in the model are the households, followed by the banking sector
which is modelled as a single agent representing the entire banking system. The central bank and
firms are not explicitly modelled but their actions and interactions with the other agents are proxied
by historical time series which are injected into the simulation. Finally, the government is modelled
in a very elementary manner, providing an unemployment benefit to the households in need.
Households form their income expectations in a boundedly rational way and, based on those,
devise their consumption plans. If their own financial resources are sufficient to meet their desired
consumption level they do so and deposit any remaining funds. Alternatively, they ask for credit
from the bank. The bank decides how much credit to extend and at what price on the basis of both
internal properties as well as external factors. The former include the bank’s risk tolerance and
capital adequacy, while the latter are the potential borrower’s risk and the central bank’s policy
rate. The market modelled in the most detail is the credit market, with endogenous interactions
taking place between potential borrowers and the bank. The labour market is passively modelled,
with the historical evolution of income and unemployment emulating the results of the interaction
between households and firms.
The following subsections present in detail the mechanics of the model from its initialisation to
a comprehensive description of the agents and the rules that underlie their behaviour.
2.1 Initialisation
The goal of the initialisation process is to reconstruct the prevailing economic environment at the
chosen origin of the simulation and embed the model in it. In that way, it ensures that the simulation
begins as closely as possible to the specific country it attempts to model.
The data-driven nature of the agent-based model starts with the initialisation of households’
income. Based on historical data, income is distributed among households according to a Γ(α, 1/λ)
distribution. Empirical studies show that this functional form adequately describes the distribution
of income in several countries over time (Bandourian et al., 2002). Moreover, fine-tuning the
distribution’s shape (α) and scale (λ) parameters allows the simulated and historical distributions
match in terms of minimum and average values as well as in their dispersion.
Another key variable, initialised according to historical data, is unemployment. The percentage
of unemployed persons in the total working population in the simulation mirrors its real-world
counterpart and thus determines the exact number of unemployed households. Therefore, after
income is distributed, the appropriate number of random households is chosen and their income is
fixed equal to the unemployment benefit.
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After initialisation, the model runs for a burn-in period of N time steps without any changes
in the amount of income that households receive nor their employment status. At the end of the
burn-in period the model is considered to have reached its equilibrium state and the simulation
starts. The evolution of every variable is thereafter either fed into the model as an exogenous
input, or it is endogenously generated as a result of agents’ interactions.
2.2 Sequence of events
The timeline of events in the simulation is presented below:
1. Historical data of household- and bank-related variables are updated.
2. Households collect interest from any deposits they might keep at the bank.
3. Employed households receive their monthly income according to the historical figures of in-
come’s growth.
4. The real-world data on unemployment determine the employment status of households.
5. Households form their income expectations.
6. Households try to meet any financial obligations they might have and form their desired
consumption plans.
7. Households without the necessary financial resources to achieve the desired level of consump-
tion ask for credit.
8. The bank estimates the maximum amount of credit it can offer along with the associated
interest rate and makes its offer to the potential borrower.
9. Households decide how much to borrow and the loan’s characteristics (size, interest rate) are
established.
10. Households fulfill their consumption plans to the maximum extent possible and deposit any
excess funds that might remain.
2.3 Agent and market description
The following subsections describe in detail the different types of agents and their behavioural rules
that determine their interactions in the various markets.
2.3.1 Households
Expectations formation
Each time step in the simulation begins with households receiving -exogenously- their monthly
income. Their first action is to form their income expectations. These constitute a fundamental
element which subsequently determines households’ desired consumption and drives their demand
for credit.
Based on the respective literature on expectations formation, households form their income
expectations in a boundedly rational way. More specifically, the heuristics switching model (HSM)
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described by Anufriev and Hommes (2012a,b) controls their expectations formation. Under the
HSM, agents employ a small collection of simple forecasting heuristics and at each time step choose
to use one based on its past performance and agent-specific, behavioural characteristics.
The HSM encompasses in a single framework many of the empirical regularities regarding expec-
tations formation such as their heterogeneity within a population (Frankel and Froot, 1987; Allen
and Taylor, 1990; Mankiw et al., 2003; Branch, 2004; Fehr and Tyran, 2008; Pfajfar and Santoro,
2010, among others) and the evolutionary selection of forecasting rules based on their performance
(Marimon and Sunder, 1995; Arifovic and Sargent, 2003).
Moreover, it has exhibited a very good fit to experimental as well as survey data in numerous
studies and in a variety of contexts ranging from financial to macroeconomic in nature (Hommes
et al., 2005, 2008; Assenza et al., 2019; Hommes et al., 2019).8 A detailed description of the HSM’s
mechanics is provided in Appendix B.
Desired consumption
After forming their income expectations, households devise their consumption plans. Their
desired consumption (Cdh,t) depends on their expected income and their capacity to sustain them-
selves. The last condition hinges on their ability to have a consumption equal to the needed level
of subsistence and influences their solvency. The rule in Equation 1 encapsulates this behaviour:
Cdh,t =
{
Cmin,t, Ih,t +Dh,t−1 < LPh,t + Cmin,t
max{αy · I
e
h,t+1 + αw ·Dh,t−1, Cmin,t}, Ih,t +Dh,t−1 ≥ LPh,t + Cmin,t
(1)
with 1 > αy > αw > 0 denoting the marginal propensities to consume out of income and wealth
respectively.
The amount of households’ liquid wealth differentiates their behaviour; it determines a house-
hold’s solvency and whether or not it will ask for credit. Primarily, households’ current income (Ih,t)
and accumulated deposits (Dh,t−1) must allow them to maintain a minimum level of consumption,
equal to the subsistence level (Cmin,t). However, if households cannot meet their monthly loan
payment (LPh,t) and survive, they decide to consume as little as possible and miss any potential
loan payments due. Alternatively, they service their debt and attempt to consume an amount
proportional to their expected income (Ieh,t+1) and past deposits. In order to achieve their desired
level of consumption, households first use their own financial resources. If spending their income
and withdrawing their deposits proves insufficient, then they turn to the bank to ask for consumer
credit.
The Modigliani consumption function (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954) described in Equation
1 is frequently used by the ABM literature (Riccetti et al., 2013; Delli Gatti and Desiderio, 2015;
Gualdi et al., 2015; Riccetti et al., 2015; Assenza et al., 2015; Caiani et al., 2016; Russo et al.,
2016; Gurgone et al., 2018; Reissl, 2020a,b, among others).9. Furthermore, the results in Section
4.2 indicate that it yields a good match between the simulated and historical aggregate series of
consumption.
8For reviews of the recent literature on the experimental study of expectations formation the works of Assenza
et al. (2014) and Cornand and Heinemann (2014) provide excellent references.
9The interested reader is referred to the work of Dawid and Delli Gatti (2018) and references therein for an
overview of consumption functions implemented in several macroeconomic ABMs.
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2.3.2 Bank
A single bank agent represents the economy’s banking system. The bank takes households’ deposits
paying an interest of rDt and provides them with consumer credit after evaluating their requests.
The size (Lh,t) and interest rate (r
L
h,t) of the provided credit are estimated by the bank for each
potential borrower and depend on both bank-specific and external factors.
The external factors include the central bank’s key policy rate and the potential borrower’s risk.
Both of them have a direct effect on the supplied credit’s interest rate and thus affect the volume
of credit in the economy and households’ solvency. The key policy rate provides the floor above
which the bank adds a mark-up to generate the offered interest rate (Freixas and Rochet, 2008).
The mark-up associated with borrower’s risk is a convex function of their leverage, i.e. their total
debt as a share of their annual income (DTI). The rationale behind this functional form is that the
bank requires higher compensation when it assumes higher risk. The possible new debt, in addition
to any existing debt, is taken into account in the calculation of a household’s leverage. The bank
estimates households’ annual income simply as 12 times their current monthly income, implicitly
assuming that it will remain unchanged.
The internal factors are the bank’s risk tolerance and its capital adequacy. The former is proxied
by the maximum debt-service-to-income ratio (DSTI) that the bank is willing to accept for any
potential borrower.10 It predominantly influences the amount of credit that the bank is prepared
to provide and changes over time. From a credit supply-side perspective, a related measure of the
bank’s risk tolerance is households’ leverage. Similarly to the maximum DSTI, the bank sets a
maximum DTI target above which refuses to provide credit. Finally, the bank’s capital adequacy
(CAR) is a key internal factor in determining the interest rate, rLh,t. Since the findings of the
empirical literature are not conclusive regarding the direction of the relationship between a bank’s
capital adequacy and loan interest rates, two cases are considered; a positive relationship and a
negative one.
It should be noted that due to their nature, bank-specific factors can be used as instruments
for the conduct of macroprudential policy, hence they also have an exogenous aspect. Among the
factors considered in the simulation, CAR is identical to the real-world series. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that it already incorporates any imposed regulatory constraints.
The remaining two factors (DSTI and DTI) are calibrated so that the results replicate the
observed patterns and not examined as extensive, counterfactual scenarios. The main reason behind
this choice is that the purpose of the study is to uncover the interest rate setting mechanism. In
addition to that, data from the European Systemic Risk Board indicate that until recently most
borrower-based regulatory constraints applied to real estate lending, while consumer credit has been
subject to less strict measures, if at all.11 Thus, DSTI and DTI can be considered to mostly reflect
the bank’s risk attitude rather than the result of tight regulation. Nevertheless, this shows the
model’s flexibility to be applied on a topic with high policy interest such as the impact of specific
macroprudential measures on credit growth and the evolution of interest rates.
2.3.3 Credit market
In the credit market, households without the financial resources to meet their desired consumption
level ask for credit from the bank. The minimum amount of consumer credit that a household asks
10The DSTI is the ratio of interest payments plus amortisations over the potential borrower’s monthly income.
11For the evolution of the application of various macroprudential measures across EU jurisdictions, the interested
reader can consult the respective reports from the European Systemic Risk Board (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020).
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for is determined by Equation 2:
Laskh,t = C
d
h,t − (Ih,t +Dh,t−1) (2)
Subsequently, the bank determines the maximum size of the loan that is willing to extend
conditional on two constraints. The first one is associated with the potential borrower’s DTI:
Lmax,DTIh,t = DTI
max · (12 · Ih,t)−Bh,t−1 (3)
Equation 3 directly determines the maximum amount of credit that can be provided as a fixed
fraction (DTImax) of the borrower’s annual income, taking into account any pre-existing debt they
might currently have (Bh,t−1). The associated maximum monthly payment with L
max,DTI
h,t is:
LPmax,DTIh,t =
rL,DTIh,t · (L
max,DTI
h,t +Bh,t−1)
1− (1 + rL,DTIh,t )
−m
(4)
The second constraint is linked with the household’s DSTI. The respective maximum monthly
payment is defined as:
LPmax,DSTIh,t = DSTI
max
t · Ih,t (5)
Based on LPmax,DSTIh,t , the largest amount of credit that the bank can provide is:
Lmax,DSTIh,t =
LPmax,DSTIh,t · [1− (1 + r
L,DSTI
h,t )
−m]
rL,DSTIh,t
−Bh,t−1 (6)
The maturity, m, of the loan is fixed and measured in months. The interest rates, rL,DTIh,t and
rL,DSTIh,t , can be a function of the central bank’s policy rate, the potential borrower’s leverage and
the bank’s capital adequacy. In general, the two constrains imply different values for the maximum
interest rate. The detailed interest rate setting mechanism is elaborated in the next subsection.
The final loan offer is controlled by the most binding constraint between the DTI- and DSTI-
related one:
LP offerh,t = min{LP
max,DSTI
h,t , LP
max,DTI
h,t } (7)
Depending on which one is the minimum, all the remaining parameters such as the size of the
loan (Lofferh,t ) and its interest rate are set accordingly.
12
Finally, Equation 8 describes household’s decision regarding the volume of debt it will assume:
Lh,t =
{
Lofferh,t , L
ask
h,t ≥ L
offer
h,t
U(Laskh,t , L
offer
h,t ), L
ask
h,t < L
offer
h,t
(8)
Therefore, if the size of the loan offered is smaller than what the household demanded, it assumes
as much as the bank supplies. Alternatively, it chooses a random amount in the range between
Laskh,t and L
offer
h,t . Once the household and the bank agree on the size of the loan, Lh,t, the interest
rate rLh,t and the monthly payment LPh,t are calculated and established.
12Equivalently, the Equation Lofferh,t = min{L
max,DSTI
h,t , L
max,DTI
h,t } can be used to determine the parameters of
the loan offer.
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The stochastic credit assumption mechanism in Equation 8 is the same as in Papadopoulos
(2019). The intuition behind the stochastic part of the rule is twofold; the bank offers the largest
permitted amount because it wants to maximize its interest revenues, and households consider
getting more credit since this allows them to consume more. From a modelling perspective, this
approximation addresses the problem of the implausibly small loans implied by Equation 2, while
at the same time replicates the dynamics of consumer credit in a satisfactory way.
2.3.4 Interest rate setting mechanism
The key part of the model is the endogenous interest rate setting mechanism. The rule that the
bank uses to determine it consists of several components. The basis on which the bank puts a
mark-up is the central bank’s policy rate, iCBt . Together with that, two additional mark-ups are
examined in this study; a mark-up based only on borrower’s risk, and one with an extra component
associated with the bank’s capital adequacy.
Lending rate and borrower’s risk
The simplest mechanism (MDTIφ ) connects borrower’s risk with the lending rate. Household
leverage (DTIh,t) proxies their risk and a convex function links it with interest rate:
rLh,t = i
CB
t + r
φ
h,t = i
CB
t + φ
DTIh,t (9)
where φ > 1 is a parameter determining how sharply does the bank raise the charged interest
rate as the borrower’s risk increases. The rationale behind this functional form is that the bank
will require an increasingly higher premium for providing credit to more leveraged and thus more
risky borrowers. Evidently, higher (lower) values of φ reflect lower (higher) risk appetite and tighter
(looser) lending standards by the bank. Although in principle there is no upper limit for φ’s values,
a reasonable range would be 1 < φ ≤ 3. In general, the floor13 for the final interest rate is about
1 percentage point above the central bank’s policy rate. However, φ ∈ (1, 3] implies that the
maximum cost for a household taking a loan of the size of its annual income will be 3 p.p. above
the key policy rate, while for a loan twice as large it will be 3 times as much.
Lending rate and bank’s capital adequacy
The most common approach regarding the interest rate setting mechanism in macroeconomic
ABMs is some variation of the previous rule, i.e. a monotonically increasing function of borrowers’
leverage. However, some studies employ an additional part which connects the interest rate with the
lender’s financial soundness (Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Cardaci, 2018; Alexandre and Lima, 2020). In
particular, the assumed relationship is a negative one, meaning that a more robust, from a financial
point of view, banking system provides credit at more favourable terms.
Since the findings of the empirical literature are inconclusive about the direction of the relation-
ship between lending rates and banks’ financial health, two mechanisms are considered; a positive
(Mθφ) and a negative one (M
τ
φ). The measure of the bank’s financial condition is its capital ad-
equacy ratio (CARt). Higher CARt figures indicate a better capitalised and therefore, sounder
banking system.
Under the positively related rule a financially healthier bank will charge a higher interest rate
on its borrowers as follows:
13Corresponding to very low-leverage households and any value of φ > 1 or any leverage level and φ ≈ 1.
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rLh,t = i
CB
t + r
φ
h,t + r
θ
t = i
CB
t + φ
DTIh,t + logθ(CARt) (10)
Compared to Equation 9, the additional component in Equation 10 is rθt . The logarithm of
CARt links the interest rate with the bank’s capital adequacy, with θ > 1 being the logarithm’s
base. The closer the θ is to 1, the higher the associated mark-up. For instance, for CARt ≃ 8%
14
the resulting additional mark-up for θ = 1.2 is rθ=1.2t = 11.4 p.p. while the respective figure for
θ = 5 is almost 10 times smaller at rθ=5t = 1.3 p.p. A positive relationship between r
θ
t and CARt
can be the outcome of various, non mutually exclusive, bank actions. One such action is associated
with the cost of equity. The better a bank is capitalised in excess of the regulatory minimum,
the more compensation it will seek for the higher cost of equity. Another behaviour producing the
same result could be the motivation of a less capitalised bank to accept more risk in order to receive
higher returns.15 On the flip side, a well capitalised bank has the incentive to charge higher interest
rates, and thus decrease the provided volume of credit, since there is more capital at risk.
The final alternative associates the bank’s capital adequacy and the offered interest rate with a
negative relationship. This is expressed by the following rule:
rLh,t = i
CB
t + r
φ
h,t + r
τ
t = i
CB
t + φ
DTIh,t + (CARt)
−τ (11)
where τ > 0 a parameter determining the strength of the relationship. A reasonable upper limit
for τ would be τ < 1 given that for common levels of CARt at around 8%, this would increase
the final interest rate by rτ=0.9t = 9.7 p.p. As in the previous case, there are several underlying
motives which can potentially give rise to such behaviour. One theory suggests that bank capital
acts as a disciplining device which forces banks to put more effort into loan monitoring. Another
possibility is associated with an under-capitalised bank’s motivation to lower its risk exposure in
order to protect its franchise value in the event of failure. Finally, there is the hypothesis that a
better capitalised bank will seek to increase its market share. All of these cases imply that bank
capital is negatively associated with interest rates and positively with lending volumes.
2.3.5 Labour market
In a full-fledged ABM, firms and households would interact in the labour market determining,
among others16, the employment status and income of the latter. Since firms are not modelled
explicitly, historical time series proxy their interactions with households in the simulation.
The monthly income that households are initially endowed with is calibrated to match the
observed distribution of income of the simulated economies at the origin of the simulation. Subse-
quently, real-world data on income’s growth govern its evolution in the model economy. It should
be noted that the imposed path of income is applied in a uniform manner upon households. Thus,
any change in the aggregate income series is translated into an equal change for every individual
household’s income.
Similarly to income, the observed series of unemployment rate control households’ employment
status. The appropriate number of households is affected by aggregate unemployment’s changes
in a random fashion. Unemployed households receive a dole equal to 80% of the contemporary
minimum wage which allows them to maintain a minimum level of consumption.
14This was the average CARt across EU countries in early 2008.
15Assuming that higher returns will come from lower interest rates but increased lending volumes.
16The complex interactions would also affect firms’ properties such as their productive capacity but this will not
be discussed here.
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This modelling choice is mainly dictated by the lack of more granular data on the monthly
evolution of income and unemployment by households’ income level. Nevertheless, the positive
skewness of income’s distribution implies that a randomly influencing unemployment will generally
affect households at the bottom of income’s distribution more than those at the top.
3 Data
A distinguishing feature of this study’s ABM is its data-driven nature. Instead of modelling every
part of the economy in the same detail, historical data proxy the actions of several agents and the
result of their interactions in the respective markets.
Input data can be grouped in 2 major categories; scenario data and calibration data. The former
are injected into the simulation and updated on every time step, whereas the latter are used to
initialise the model according to the prevailing conditions of a certain economy at a specific point
in time.
The country scenarios examined refer to the Cypriot, Slovenian and the UK economies, thus
increasing the set of countries on which the model is applied to compared to the original (Pa-
padopoulos, 2019). In addition to studying another economy, on top of Slovenia and the UK which
were originally modelled, this is a test of the model’s flexibility to accommodate different scenarios
and an assessment of its performance.
An important observation regarding every data category is that their quality can significantly
affect the results. Obviously, the closer the injected data are to the historical reality, the more
similar are expected the simulated series to be to the realized ones. It follows that minimising
data-related discrepancies between input and real-world data allows a cleaner study of the model’s
mechanics and in particular the interest rate setting mechanism.
3.1 Scenario data
The simulation begins in January 2000 and extends until mid-2019, covering almost twenty years
of data. Each time step in the model represents one month in physical time, therefore any series
collected in lower frequencies are converted to monthly using spline interpolation. Figure 1 and
Figure 2 display the evolution of the country-specific, historical series which are injected into the
simulation.
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Figure 1: The original, household-related series of the macroeconomic scenario injected into the
simulation. Wages & salaries (left) and unemployment rate (right).
The left panel in Figure 1 shows the series of wages & salaries17 whose growth closely resembles
the one of net disposable income which would be ideally used.18 It is deflated by the GDP deflator,
transformed into monthly frequency through spline interpolation and fed into the model in monthly
growth rates. The right panel displays the evolution of unemployment (as a % of active population).
It is already collected in monthly frequency and, like income, is injected into the simulation in
monthly growth rates.
17Referred to simply as income for brevity for the remainder of the study.
18Comparison with available resources on net disposable income such as a related, yet discontinued, dataset from
Eurostat (ei naia q) and another from the IDCM confirms the similarity in growth rates between the two series.
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
LI
R
t,
 
[%
]
2000m1 2005m1 2010m1 2015m1 2020m1
CY SI UK
Source: ECB SDW, MFI Interest Rate Statistics & Bank of England | Database
0
1
2
3
4
D
IR
t,
 
[%
]
2000m1 2005m1 2010m1 2015m1 2020m1
CY SI UK
Source: ECB SDW, MFI Interest Rate Statistics
5
10
15
20
25
CA
R t
,
 
[%
]
2000m1 2005m1 2010m1 2015m1 2020m1
CY SI UK
Source: ECB SDW, Risk Assessment Indicators
0
2
4
6
i tC
B ,
 
[%
]
2000m1 2005m1 2010m1 2015m1 2020m1
ECB BoE
Source: BIS policy rate statistics
Figure 2: The original, bank-related series of the macroeconomic scenario injected into the simu-
lation. Consumer credit interest rate (top left), overnight deposit interest rate (top right), capital
adequacy ratio (bottom left) and policy rate (bottom right).
Every series shown in Figure 2 enters into the model in levels, without any interpolation. The
only transformation applied is the conversion of the reported, annualized interest rates into monthly
ones.19
The top row presents the evolution of bank lending (left) and overnight deposit (right) interest
rate series.20 The former have a dual role in the simulation; they are used as scenario input during
the calibration of the DSTI series, while they are the benchmark against which the output from
the various interest rate mechanisms is tested. In particular, for the case of Cyprus and Slovenia,
the lending rate refers to credit for consumption and other lending with maturity above 1 and up
to 5 years, denominated in euro. For the UK, it corresponds to personal loans with floating rate, in
pound sterling. The top right panel depicts the evolution of overnight deposit interest rates from
households in euro (CY and SI) and pound sterling (UK).
19CARt is injected as a percentage in the case of the positive interest rate rule and as a fraction 0 < CARt < 1
in the negative one.
20In the simulation the missing values for any interest rate series have been replaced by the average of their first
12 observations.
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The bottom left panel in Figure 2 displays the monthly series of the banking systems’ CARt
which is defined as the sum of capital and reserves divided by total assets.21 Finally, the bottom
right panel in Figure 2 shows the key policy rates set by the respective central banks; the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England (BoE). It should be noted that, for simplicity, it is
assumed that the ECB policy rate applies for the whole period in the simulations using the scenarios
for Cyprus and Slovenia. Thus, any part of the scenario that does not reflect the exact real-world
settings can be considered to correspond to a fictional economy. It follows that model validation
and the investigation of the interest rate setting mechanism are relevant only when the scenario
mirrors the historical reality.
Overall, Figure 1 and Figure 2 demonstrate the difficult situation that households and banks
had to go through during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (GFC) and its aftermath. The former
faced declining incomes and rising unemployment while the latter slashed their interest rates and
consequently their related profits.
3.2 Calibration data
Calibration data differ from scenario data in that they are static in nature and are used for ini-
tialising the simulation. The purpose of the latter is to embed the model into a specific economic
environment and ensure that the simulation begins as closely as possible to the economy it attempts
to model.
One subcategory of calibration data corresponds to households’ income and employment status
variables. The historical figures of minimum and average monthly income, as well as the Gini
coefficient control the distribution of initial income among households. Gini coefficient’s source
is the UNU-WIDER, World Income Inequality Database (WIID)22, whereas Eurostat’s database
provides the needed input on average and minimum monthly income.23 In addition to income-
related calibration data, Eurostat’s database is used to calibrate initial monthly unemployment.
The second subcategory includes every bank-related variable such as loan and deposit interest
rates, capital adequacy and the central bank’s policy rate. In this case, calibration data and
their sources are the same as the scenario data and only the observation one month prior to the
simulation’s start is used.
Table 1 reports the calibrated values of the initial setup for every country-specific scenario.
21In some studies this ratio is also referred to as leverage.
22Version date 6 May 2020.
23In particular, Eurostat’s series on average annual gross earnings (earn gr isco) and monthly minimum wages
(earn mw cur). For Cyprus, minimum wages are backdated from International Labour Organization’s data on
statutory nominal gross monthly minimum wages.
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Table 1: Initial setup of the simulation for CY, SI and UK.
Description Country scenario
CY SI UK
Average income 1480 1000 2430
Minimum income 600 350 950
Gini coefficient of income distribution (%) 28 23 35
Unemployment rate (%) 4.6 7.1 5.8
Consumer credit interest rate (%) 7.758 5.257 7.058
Overnight deposit interest rate (%) 1.594 0.348 2.621
Capital adequacy ratio (%) - - 8.641
Central bank policy rate (%) 3.0 3.0 5.5
DSTI (%) 42 50 56
It should be noted that the missing initial values of capital adequacy ratio in the CY and SI
scenarios do not affect the results. The capital adequacy ratio is needed for the study of the interest
rate setting mechanism described in Equation 11 and therefore its use is meaningful only after the
two countries joined the euro area (in 2008 and 2007 respectively).
3.3 DSTI data
The case of DSTI is a special one, sharing elements of both scenario and calibration data. Similarly
to scenario data, DSTI24 is updated in every time step in the simulation. However, its path as well
as its initial values are calibrated in a process discussed in detail in Appendix C.
The calibration of DSTI is necessary in the absence of exact historical data on its evolution.
The only publicly available source which provides an adequate approximation is the database for
debt service ratios statistics from the BIS. This database contains quarterly series of aggregate
DSTI for various countries and sectors in a consistent way. The methodology for its construction is
described in (Drehmann et al., 2015) and suggests that although it captures DSTI’s evolution in a
satisfactory manner, nevertheless the reported levels do not reflect the accurate figures one would
get from micro data. Therefore, both its trajectory and initial values need to be calibrated.
The calibration procedure is based on a grid-search attempting to find the DSTI path and its
associated level which yield the maximum similarity between the model-generated and historical
series of consumer credit.
A fundamental assumption underlying DSTI’s calibration procedure is that the evolution of the
actual series is similar to the approximated series of debt service ratios in BIS’s database. This is
particularly relevant for Cyprus and Slovenia which are not included there. Nonetheless, even if a
country included in the simulation is covered by the BIS (as is the UK), it is not necessarily the case
24More precisely, the maximum DSTI accepted by the bank.
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that the reported, aggregate DSTI series would be a good match to the specific, real-world DSTI
series for consumer credit. As is exhibited in Papadopoulos (2019), housing and consumer credit
DSTIs can have very different dynamics which in turn will affect the evolution of the respective
credit series. Therefore, it is worth keeping such data-quality issues in mind when interpreting the
simulation’s results.
3.4 Fixed parameters
Finally, a set of parameters is fixed across every simulation and is not data-related, but their
calibration is guided by the literature. These parameters are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Fixed parameter values.
Description Parameter Value Equation #
Number of households H 1000 -
Burn-in period N 170 -
Propensity to consume out of income αy 0.65 1
Propensity to consume out of deposits αw 0.05 1
WTR expectations extrapolation factor ωwtr 0.4 12
STR expectations extrapolation factor ωstr 1.3 13
ADA expectations parameter ωada 0.65 14
Households’ memory strength η 0.7 16
Households’ expectations rule persistence δ 0.9 17
Households’ intensity of choice β 0.4 17
Loan maturity (in months) m 60 4, 6
Both propensities to consume assume values frequently used in the respective literature (Godley
and Lavoie, 2016; Assenza et al., 2015; Meijers et al., 2018, among others). Regarding the HSM-
related parameters, their values are set to those identified in the original studies by Anufriev and
Hommes (2012a,b). Finally, loan maturity is fixed to 5 years which is a reasonable period of time
for this type of credit.25
4 Simulation results
The focus of the simulation is the identification of the lending rate setting mechanism by the bank.
Each mechanism (MDTIφ ,M
θ
φ and M
τ
φ) described in subsection 2.3.4 is implemented in every
25Nonetheless, loan maturity can have important implications for household DSTI and therefore credit growth.
However, due to absence of specific data on loan maturity, the approximation of it being fixed at 5 years is considered
to be reasonable.
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country scenario and their output is recorded. Subsequently, the artificial interest rate series26 are
compared to the actual ones and the one which yields the closest match between the two is selected.
Finally, everything is put together and the model’s output is validated against the real-world data.
4.1 How do candidate mechanisms perform?
The examination of the mechanisms’ performance is, in essence, the calibration of their associated
parameters, φ, θ and τ , in order to obtain an output as close as possible to the observed lending rate
series. A parameter with a broader scope, in addition to the rule-specific ones, which also needs
calibration is DTImax. This parameter controls the highest level of a household’s leverage up to
which the bank is willing to extend credit.
The calibration process consists of a grid-search over each interest rate rule’s respective param-
eter space. The chosen ranges for each parameter lie within reasonable bounds, based on the dis-
cussion in subsection 2.3.4, while keeping a balance between computational cost and an adequately
fine space. Table 3 reports the intervals within which the parameters vary across simulations.
Table 3: Lending rate mechanisms’ parameter space.
Parameter Min Max Step Equation #
DTImax 2 3 0.2 3
φ 1.2 2.4 0.2 9
θ 1.5 5 0.5 10
τ 0.1 0.6 0.1 11
For every rule all possible parameter configurations, according to the ranges shown in Table 3
are tested. This translates into 42 distinct pairs of {DTImax, φ} for mechanism MDTIφ , 56 pairs of
{θ, φ} forMθφ and another 42 pairs of {τ, φ} for the third mechanism,M
τ
φ. For the implementation
of both lending rate mechanisms which are related to the bank’s capital adequacy, DTImax is fixed
to the figures identified in the analysis related to MDTIφ . Practically, these values are sufficiently
high and rarely reached in the simulations given the mechanics of the model, while they result in
DTIs which fall within plausible ranges considering relevant historical data.27
Every rule configuration is applied to the 3 country scenarios and the simulation is executed
100 times. The average of each model-generated interest rate is estimated and compared to the
historical series. It should be noted that the comparison period between the artificial and the
historical interest rate series differs among scenarios. In particular, for CY and SI it begins at the
dates when Cyprus and Slovenia joined the euro area, in January 2008 and 2007 respectively. This
is reasonable since the policy rate prior to that period was set by each national central bank and
26The aggregate, model-generated interest rate is the average lending rate charged at each month.
27The closest data available are from Eurostat and the OECD. Both refer to total debt by households (including
non-profit institutions serving households) as a share of their gross or net disposable income, respectively.
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differed from the ECB’s policy rate which is used in the simulation.28. On the contrary, in the UK
scenario the validation period starts at the earliest possible date conditional on the availability of
historical data.
From the wide range of available methods to assess a model’s fit (for an interesting discussion and
an approach focusing on the frequency domain see McAdam and Mestre (2008)), the distance and
synchronisation between the artificial and real-world series is chosen. The former is quantified with
the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and the latter with Pearson’s, zero-lag, cross-correlation coefficient
(ρ). Finally, from each rule “family” (i.e. the borrower risk only and the 2 capital adequacy related
rules) the best performing configurations are selected and compared to each other. This “horse
race” reveals which rule “family” best approximates each banking system’s interest rate setting
mechanism as well as its particular set of parameters.
4.1.1 Borrower risk only rule (MDTIφ )
The simplest mechanism examined is the one described in Equation 9 which, in addition to the
policy rate, links the bank’s offered lending rate only with the borrower’s risk. Figure 3 presents
the results from the application of the borrower risk only rule in each scenario. The rows show the
results for each country scenario. Column-wise, on the left is the distance measure and on the right
the correlation between the simulated and the observed lending rates.
28A similar study could be performed for the period prior to the countries’ adoption of the euro. However, lack of
data on unsecured consumer credit and the associated lending rates prohibit the validation of the results from such
analysis.
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Figure 3: Distance and synchronisation measures between the simulated and historical consumer
credit lending rates under theMDTIφ mechanism. Circles denote the best performing configurations
and Xs those with statistically equal performance to the former at 95% confidence level.
A notable pattern in the right panels of Figure 3 is the high level of synchronisation between
the model-generated and the historical series. For most parameter pairs, ρ is above 0.8 in every
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country scenario. This is particularly evident in SI where the minimum ρ is around 0.93. Moreover,
the analysis indicates that many configurations have, statistically, the same correlation with the
best performing one. However, MAE figures in the left panels show a different picture.
In both CY and SI scenarios the best performing configurations for this rule are concentrated
in the upper regions of the plot. In the UK scenario this pattern reverses and the lowest MAEs are
exhibited by parameter pairs at the bottom of the plot. In general, the strongest improvement in
performance is observed along the vertical axis, whereas MAE’s decrease along the horizontal axis
is much more weak. In particular, for CY and SI the rule’s performance increases for higher φ and
DTImax values, while the opposite is true for the UK scenario.
Since correlation is adequately high for virtually every pair of {DTImax, φ}, the best performing
candidates are selected based on their MAEs. Testing their absolute errors reveals that a few
configurations have statistically equal MAEs with the best performing one.29
4.1.2 Positively related to capital adequacy rule (Mθφ)
Based on the previous analysis, DTImax is fixed for the implementation of both mechanisms related
to the bank’s capital adequacy. The values for the CY, SI and the UK scenarios are set toDTImax =
2.6, DTImax = 2.8 and DTImax = 2.6 respectively. These figures are reasonably high and are
among the best performing ones.
The mechanism Mθφ adds an extra element to the borrower-risk only rule which is a concave
link with the bank’s capital adequacy as described in Equation 10. The implementation of this rule
yields the results shown in Figure 4.
29Given the large sample sizes (>130 observations), the test employed is a t-test with unequal variances using
Welch’s approximation and a 95% confidence level. Wilcoxon’s non-parametric test yields similar results.
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Figure 4: Distance and synchronisation measures between the simulated and historical consumer
credit lending rates under the Mθφ mechanism. Circles denote the best performing configurations
and Xs those with statistically equal performance to the former at 95% confidence level.
The results in the right panel of Figure 4 show that the output from the Mθφ mechanism
broadly shares the same high degree of synchronisation with the observed lending rates as the
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MDTIφ mechanism.
In terms of distance though, the best-performance region in the left panels exhibits a wide
“corridor” structure. The width of the corridor is possibly associated with the relatively large size
of the parameter space’s sampling step. The improvement path’s direction is from the bottom-left
to the top-right of the plot, i.e. towards both high φ and high θ values, a shape more apparent in
the CY and SI scenarios. This is an expected pattern; higher values of θ imply a lower contribution
from the capital adequacy element of the rule in the overall interest rate. Therefore, the remaining
part is covered by the borrower risk related element, i.e. higher values for φ.
Interestingly, the configurations with the lowest MAE are located in different regions for every
scenario. In CY they are found in the medium-high range of θ and medium levels of φ. On the
contrary, in SI they are in the low end of both θ and φ. This indicates that, all else equal, the
capital adequacy component is contributing more in the latter compared to borrower risk. Another
alternative is that in the SI scenario borrowers have higher risk and/or the banking system lower
capital adequacy than the CY one. In fact, as seen in Figure 2, CARt in CY is substantially
higher -especially after 2012- compared to the rest scenarios, thus higher figures for θ (denoting
lower contribution) should be probably expected. Finally, in the case of the UK scenario the best
performing parameter combinations have low φs and high θs indicating a minimal contribution from
both elements of the mechanism. This is most likely related to the exceptionally low levels of the
historical lending rates. In the top-left panel of Figure 2, UK lending rates are the lowest hovering
around 3% after 2010. Thus, implementing this mechanism requires very low contributions from
both of its parts in order for the artificial lending rates to remain close to the observed figures.
4.1.3 Negatively related to capital adequacy rule (Mτφ)
The final interest rate setting mechanism is described in Equation 11 and links the lending rate
and the bank’s capital adequacy with a monotonically decreasing function. Applying Mτφ on each
scenario yields the results presented in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Distance and synchronisation measures between the simulated and historical consumer
credit lending rates under the Mτφ mechanism. Circles denote the best performing configurations
and Xs those with statistically equal performance to the former at 95% confidence level.
Like the previous cases, the simulated lending rates are very strongly correlated with the real-
world series as the results in the right panels in Figure 5 show. The overall minimum ρ across all
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country scenarios is about 0.75 with the maximum values being above 0.97.
Distance-wise, the results from the implementation of Mτφ also exhibit a “corridor” structure.
The corridor is narrower compared to Mθφ’s possibly due to the finer sampling step. As expected,
its direction is from high-φ/low-τ parameter combinations to low-φ/high-τ ones.
The statistical tests reveal that, in terms of lowest MAEs, the equally performing configurations
are spread across each corridor’s path in the cases of CY and SI. On the contrary, in the UK scenario
the best performing parameter pairs are located in the bottom-left corner of the plot and none has
statistically equal MAE to the best one. This particular characteristic is similar to the pattern
observed for the same scenario in the Mθφ mechanism and has likely the same underlying cause;
the low levels of the historical interest rates. In order for the simulated series to stay close to the
real-world ones, it is necessary to keep the contributions from each mechanism’s constituent parts
to a minimum, translated to low values for φ and low(high) values for θ(τ).
4.1.4 Identifying the best performing mechanism
The previous analysis has identified several equally performing configurations within each scenario
and mechanism family, exhibiting low distance and high correlation with the historical lending rate
series.
To determine which mechanism better approximates the real-world data, the best performing
configurations from the 3 mechanism families are compared to each other for every scenario. Table
4 presents the distance and synchronisation mesaures of the best performing configurations per
mechanism family for CY, Table 5 for SI and Table 6 for the UK scenario.
Table 4: Distance and synchronisation measures of the best performing configurations per mecha-
nism family in the CY scenario.
id # Mechanism MAE ρ
1 MDTI=2.4φ=2.2 0.446 0.931
2 MDTI=2.6φ=2.2 0.454 0.938
3 MDTI=2.8φ=2.2 0.475 0.934
4 MDTI=3.0φ=2.2 0.462 0.931
5 Mθ=3.5φ=1.8 0.821 0.844
6 Mθ=4.0φ=1.8 0.810 0.843
7 Mθ=4.5φ=1.8 0.787 0.867
8 Mθ=5.0φ=1.8 0.783 0.865
9 Mθ=5.0φ=2.0 0.822 0.901
10 Mτ=0.1φ=2.0 0.564 0.928
11 Mτ=0.3φ=1.8 0.542 0.916
12 Mτ=0.4φ=1.8 0.558 0.930
13 Mτ=0.5φ=1.6 0.539 0.907
14 Mτ=0.6φ=1.4 0.597 0.877
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The results in Table 4 reveal that the mechanism family with the lowest performance relative to
the rest is Mθφ which exhibits the highest distance and lowest synchronisation with the historical
interest rate series. The remaining two have a largely similar performances with ρs generally above
0.9 and low MAEs.
Table 5: Distance and synchronisation measures of the best performing configurations per mecha-
nism family in the SI scenario.
id # Mechanism MAE ρ
1 MDTI=2.2φ=2.4 0.582 0.958
2 MDTI=2.6φ=2.4 0.572 0.959
3 MDTI=2.8φ=2.4 0.538 0.960
4 Mθ=2φ=1.2 0.286 0.938
5 Mθ=2.5φ=1.6 0.297 0.952
6 Mθ=3φ=1.8 0.309 0.959
7 Mτ=.1φ=2 0.507 0.959
8 Mτ=.2φ=2 0.475 0.955
9 Mτ=.3φ=1.8 0.469 0.960
10 Mτ=.4φ=1.6 0.474 0.957
11 Mτ=.5φ=1.2 0.512 0.958
For the SI scenario, the reported figures in Table 5 indicate thatMθφ’s configurations (ids 4 to 6)
clearly outperform the rest in terms of MAE. On the contrary, candidate mechanisms are virtually
indistinguishable from each other as regards their correlation with the observed lending rates.
Table 6: Distance and synchronisation measures of the best performing configurations per mecha-
nism family in the UK scenario.
id # Mechanism MAE ρ
1 MDTI=2.4φ=1.6 0.378 0.962
2 MDTI=2.6φ=1.6 0.342 0.972
3 Mθ=5φ=1.2 0.328 0.982
4 Mτ=.1φ=1.2 0.340 0.976
The results for the UK scenario in Table 6 are the least populated ones. The only mechanism
represented by more than one candidate is the MDTIφ . In this case all four configurations are close
to each other both in terms of distance as well as of synchonisation with the real-world series.
Figure 6 displays the output of the statistical comparison among the different mechanism con-
figurations and the evolution of the simulated lending rate series.30
30Similarly to the previous analysis, the means equality test employed is a t-test with unequal variances using
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Welch’s approximation and a 95% confidence level. Wilcoxon’s non-parametric test yields largely the same results.
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Figure 6: Comparison among different mechanism configurations and the evolution of the simulated
lending rate series. Hollow circles (◦) denote pairs with statistically equal MAEs, filled squares ()
pairs of which the mechanism in the horizontal axis performs better and filled triangles (N) pairs of
which the mechanism in the vertical axis outperforms its counterpart. Blue lines mark the dominant
mechanism’s configurations.
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The left panels in Figure 6 present the results of the comparison among different mechanism
configurations. The 3 mechanism families are clearly recognized in the respective regions of hollow
circles near the diagonal within which the different configurations exhibit the same MAEs. However,
different mechanisms exhibit the lowest, overall, distance from the historical interest rates for each
country scenario. In the case of CY the configurations of the simple borrower-risk rule outperform
those of both capital adequacy related ones, whereas in that of SI the best performing configurations
belong to theMθφ mechanism. In line with the results of Table 6, there is no clear winner in the UK
scenario. All four configurations seem to have the same performance with the exception ofMθ=5φ=1.2
which shows a better fit when compared to MDTI=2.4φ=1.6 .
The evolution of the simulated lending rates on the right panels shows the output from the best
performing mechanisms along with the observed series (red, dashed line) for each scenario. For CY,
MDTIφ ’s configurations remain remarkably close to the historical data for most of the period under
study. Interestingly, from early 2009 until 2011 all mechanisms but Mτφ under-predict the lending
rate. During that period Mτφ’s configurations (grey, dash-dotted lines) replicate the level and the
dynamics of the historical lending rates more closely than their counterparts. In SI, virtually all
configurations replicate adequately the levels and the dynamics of the observed interest rate series
roughly until 2013. For the next 3 years no mechanism exhibits a good match up to 2016 when
Mθφ seems to perform better -though not perfectly- than the rest. This result might be associated
with the economic and financial turmoil in the country during that period and the related bank
recapitalisations that took place in late 2013 and 2014 (Bank of Slovenia, 2015). These conditions
might have caused a change in the banks’ behaviour which is not properly captured by the rules
or parameter ranges examined in this study. Finally, in the case of the UK, no single mechanism
stands apart from the rest. All exhibit a similarly good fit in the period before October 2008 and
after January 2013, but fail to follow the sharp drop in late 2008 and the dynamics in the subsequent
four-year period.
4.2 Empirical validation
Guided by the previous analysis, an individual configuration from the best performing interest rate
setting mechanism is implemented in each scenario and the model’s output is compared to the
historical series of three key variables; household consumption, consumer credit and the lending
rate. The specific configurations chosen are MDTI=2.6φ=2.2 for CY, M
θ=2.5
φ=1.6 for SI and M
DTI=2.6
φ=1.6 for
the UK scenario. While in the first two country scenarios the statistical tests reveal a dominant
mechanism family, this is not the case for the UK one. Therefore, the choice is based on the
mechanisms’ simplicity favouring MDTIφ over the capital adequacy related ones.
Each scenario is executed 100 times and the 100-run averages of the simulated series are con-
trasted to the observed data. In order to facilitate comparison, two transformations are considered;
rescaling based on the full-sample average (yt/y
mean, where yt = {Ct, Lt}) and annual growth
rates.31 As before, distance from the real-world series is quantified with MAE, while synchronisa-
tion with the the zero-lag, Pearson’s correlation coefficient.
4.2.1 Lending rate validation
Since the focus of this study is the identification of the interest rate setting mechanism which better
approximates the observed data, it is natural to begin with the validation of the lending rate series.
31%∆yoy(yt) where yt = {Ct, Lt} and ∆yoy(yt) for yt = {LIRt}.
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Although it has already been studied in subsection 4.1, the examination of some additional elements
such as growth rates and simulation ranges provides further information. On Figure 7 the panels
on the left present the results for the level series, while the ones on the right for those in growth
rates.
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Figure 7: Model validation results for lending rates.
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The plots in Figure 7 show a remarkably good fit between the model-generated and real-world
lending rates. In levels, overall MAEs are lower than half a percentage point and correlations well
above 0.9. In growth rates, distance ranges between about 2 p.p. and 5 p.p. while synchronisation
varies but mostly stays at high levels.
An interesting result is the discrepancy between the artificial and historical series in the CY
and SI scenarios during a specific part of the simulation period, roughly divided by the GFC and
its aftermath. In each scenario, the implemented mechanism exhibits a good fit either post- (in
CY) or pre-crisis (in SI), but does not perform as good in the other part. This could be due
to changes in credit demand as embedded in Equation 8 or the interest rate setting mechanism
itself. That being said, for the case of CY, the results in Figure 6 indicate that for some part
of the pre-crisis period32 some configurations from the Mτφ rule outperform their counterparts,
including the selected one (MDTI=2.6φ=2.2 ). In the case of SI the analysis didn’t identify an alternative,
better performing configuration during the post-crisis period. Therefore, the results leave open the
possibility of a different mechanism (function- or parameter-wise) being at work then.33
It should be noted that the reported distance and synchronisation figures in the boxes are
estimated based on data availability (UK after 2004) and appropriateness (CY & SI after euro
adoption). These are marked with light grey areas and lines and are not considered in the estimation
of MAE and ρ.
4.2.2 Consumer credit validation
The next model-generated series compared to the observed ones are the volumes and growth rates
of consumer credit. Figure 8 displays the evolution of the respective series along with the goodness-
of-fit measures.
32Classifying the build-up period until the bailout programme for Cyprus between the Cypriot government and
the European Commission, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund in March 2013 as “pre-crisis”.
33Another possibility is that the 5-year, fixed-maturity assumption is no longer an adequate approximation of the
real-world maturities to which the historical lending rates correspond.
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Figure 8: Model validation results for consumer credit.
Given that the evolution of credit is tied to the associated interest rates, it follows that validation
is meaningful during the same period that the latter have been also validated. Thus, the light grey
areas and lines are not considered for the estimation of the goodness-of-fit measures.34 In the case
34Assuming that the implemented mechanisms apply for the whole simulation horizon and using all available
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of CY an extra treatment has been applied on the data sample; observations after September 2018
have been discarded in order to eliminate a structural break in the real-world series which distorted
the comparison.35
The results in Figure 8 are very promising. Both simulated levels and growth rates show a
high level of synchronisation with the historical series with ρs spanning between 0.6 and above 0.85
in most cases. The only exception is the case of growth rates in the UK scenario where towards
the end of the simulation horizon the observed consumer credit grows at a higher pace than the
artificial one. Regarding distance, MAE figures indicate that model-generated and real-world data
differ by 4 p.p. to 5 p.p. in absolute terms, on average. It should be noted that a key series affecting
consumer credit is DSTI. Lacking accurate data on its level and dynamics introduces changes in the
simulated series and makes model validation more challenging. Nevertheless, despite this limitation
the model’s output remains adequately close to reality.
4.2.3 Household consumption validation
Finally, Figure 9 shows the validation results for household consumption for each country scenario.
observations for consumer credit improves some results while leaves others roughly unchanged.
35In particular, a sharp shift of around 40% in month-on-month terms, possibly due to some structural or method-
ological reason.
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Figure 9: Model validation results for household consumption.
A noticeable pattern across all scenarios, is the extremely narrow interquartile range of the
simulated series. Marked by the grey area around the average, it is barely visible. The stochastic
element controlling the width of the interquartile range is debt assumption by households and its
subsequent spending for consumer needs. Therefore, this pattern indicates that consumer credit in
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the model is a small fraction of household consumption and therefore has a small effect on it.36 By
extension, this implies that the effect of interest rate changes on consumption will be modest at
best, a result in line with other classes of macroeconomic models (McAdam and Morgan, 2003).
As seen in Figure 9 the simulated series reproduce in a satisfactory manner the dynamics of
the real-world ones both in levels and in annual growth rates. This is particularly evident in SI
and UK where they exhibit low figures of MAEs and high correlations. The results for CY display
some discrepancies, especially after 2009, but they show an acceptable fit. The latter could be due
to some part of the model not being a sufficient approximation of real-world processes after 2009;
either the underlying consumption function or the implemented income scenario could differ from
what has actually happened, leading to divergent results. However, overall, the model provides a
decent replication of the evolution of household consumption.
5 Conclusions
This study has examined the capacity of three different mechanisms, commonly used by the ABM
literature, to approximate the historical series of consumer credit interest rates. The mechanisms
were implemented within a data-driven agent-based model and their performance was studied in
three country-specific scenarios.
Naturally, the primary result is the identification of the best performing mechanism and its dis-
tinct parameter values. Nonetheless, the analysis has uncovered three more generic patterns which
extend beyond the determination of the specific mechanism per country. First, as expected, there
is heterogeneity across country scenarios regarding both the mechanism family and its particular
parameter figures that better approximate the observed data. However, it seems that, in two cases,
the simple candidates outperformed their more complicated counterparts. More precisely, in CY,
the borrower-risk only rule exhibited a better fit than any of the capital adequacy related rules.
In the UK scenario, candidate configurations from all three mechanism families performed equally
well. Therefore, given its lower complexity, the borrower-risk only rule is considered to be the
dominant one. Finally, an interesting result is the possible existence of a dynamic behaviour on the
bank’s side, likely influenced by the prevailing economic conditions. In two scenarios (CY and SI),
the best-performing mechanisms were largely identified according to their performance on a certain
part of the sample. In both cases the GFC and its repercussions seemed to be the catalytic event,
differentiating behaviour in the sub-periods determined by its occurrence.
From a policy-simulation perspective, this model can provide valuable, country-specific insights
regarding the interest rate transmission mechanism and the effect of various policies on lending
rates and credit growth. It allows the implementation of alternative monetary policy scenarios or
the introduction of macroprudential regulations and provides a quantitative assessment of their
impact on the variables under focus.
Further investigation of the lending rate mechanism’s stability over time is one of the many ways
this model can be used and extended. Another extension could be the examination of the bank’s
liability side; the evolution of deposits and their associated interest rates. Finally, a more challenging
research avenue would be to gradually replace every historical input series with endogenous rules
by modelling each part of the economy in greater detail (e.g. housing market, labour market,
private/public sector etc).
36Thus, using observations beyond the validation period of the lending rate and consumer credit series does not
have a material impact on the results.
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More broadly, this study has shown that using a data-driven ABM in which some parts of the
economy follow a specific historical scenario, instead of explicitly modelling every agent, enables the
focused investigation of specific parts of agents’ behaviour and the calibration of their parameters.
It thus represents a small step towards the development of a fully-fledged macroeconomic ABM
which is “closer to the data” than the current standard in the literature.
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A Interest rate setting in the ABM literature
Table 7 presents in a compact way the key aspects of the interest rate setting mechanism as implemented in many, recent
macroeconomic ABMs. It is a certainly non-exhaustive review of the literature but provides an overview of the features considered
in numerous studies. Regarding the bank-specific component of the lending rate, it should be noted that several models
include regulatory constrains which influence the volume of the supplied credit and hence, indirectly affect the interest rate.37
Nevertheless, since they are not directly implemented in the behavioural rule, the respective column marks them as “None
direct”.
Table 7: Interest rate setting mechanism implementation in the ABM literature.
Reference(s)
Potential
borrowers
Debt
maturity
Collateral
Interest rate
mechanism
Baseline rate
Borrower-specific
IR component
Bank-specific
IR component
Short description
Dosi et al. (2013) Firms Implicit No rL = r(1 + ψL)
Central bank
rate (r)
None None direct
Interest rate is
calculated as a fixed
mark-up on the
baseline rate
Ashraf et al. (2016,
2017); Popoyan
et al. (2020)
Firms Implicit
Inventory
and fixed
capital
rL = rw + s/48
Interest rate on
government
bonds set by
the central
bank (rw)
None None direct
Interest rate is
determined by a
fixed spread on the
baseline rate
D’Orazio and
Giulioni (2017);
D’Orazio (2019)
Households Implicit No rL = constant None None None direct
Constant interest
rate
Palagi et al. (2017) Households
Single-
period
No rb = r(1 + µb)
Central bank
rate (r)
None None direct
Interest rate is
calculated as a
constant mark-up
on the baseline rate
Poledna et al. (2020) Firms Implicit No rt = r¯ + µ
Central bank
rate (r¯)
None None direct
Interest rate is
calculated as a fixed
spread on the
baseline rate
Continues in next page
37Insofar as credit-rationing borrowers implies the absence of an applied interest rate altogether.
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Table 7 (continued)
Reference(s)
Potential
borrowers
Debt
maturity
Collateral
Interest rate
mechanism
Baseline rate
Borrower-specific
IR component
Bank-specific
IR component
Short description
Gaffeo et al. (2008);
Delli Gatti et al.
(2011)
Firms
Single-
period
No
ri,t = r¯
(
1 +
φn,t · µ(λi,t)
)
Rate set by the
monetary
authority (r¯)
Borrower i’s total
debt to net worth
ratio (λi,t)
None direct
Interest rate is
calculated as a
mark-up on the
baseline rate,
increasing with
borrowers’ leverage
Cincotti et al.
(2012); Teglio et al.
(2019)
Firms 24 No
rb,f =
rCB + γbπf
Central bank
rate (rCB)
Borrower f ’s
probability of
default (πf ), linked
to their leverage
None direct
Interest rate is
calculated as a
mark-up on the
baseline rate, linked
to borrowers’ credit
risk
Dosi et al. (2015) Firms Implicit No
rj,t = r
deb
t
(
1 +
(q − 1)kconst
)
Mark-up on
central bank
rate (rdebt =
(1 + µ)rt)
Borrower j’s credit
ranking (q) based
on their past net
worth to sales ratio
None direct
Interest rate is
calculated as a
mark-up on the
baseline rate,
depending on the
borrowers’ position
in credit ranking
Assenza et al. (2015) Firms Implicit No
rf,t =
µ
[ 1+r/θ
Ξ(θ,Tf,t)
− θ
] Risk-free rate
(r)
Borrower f ’s time
to default (Tf,t),
inversely related to
their probability to
default and a
convex function of
their leverage
None direct
Interest rate is
increasing with the
risk free rate and
decreasing with
borrowers’ time to
default (i.e.
increasing with their
leverage)
Continues in next page
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Table 7 (continued)
Reference(s)
Potential
borrowers
Debt
maturity
Collateral
Interest rate
mechanism
Baseline rate
Borrower-specific
IR component
Bank-specific
IR component
Short description
Botta et al. (2019)
Households,
Firms
Implicit No
ri,t = r
B
t−1 ·
(
1+
Debti,t/Yi,t
)
Interest rate on
risk-free
government
bonds (rBt )
Borrower i’s
leverage ratio (total
debt to HH’s
monthly disposable
income or firm’s net
profit)
None direct
Interest rate is
calculated as a
mark-up on the
risk-free rate,
determined based
on each loan’s risk,
as reflected by the
benchmark
debt-service ratio
Giri et al. (2019) Firms Implicit No
rz,t =
iCBt−1 + rpz,t
Central bank
rate (iCBt−1)
Borrower z’s debt to
net worth ratio
(rpz,t)
None direct
Interest rate is a
mark-up on the
policy rate,
associated with an
increasing function
of borrowers’
leverage
Reissl (2020a) Firms Implicit No
rjL = r0 +
µ(iLj + rep
j
CF j
)
Rate set by the
monetary
authority (r0)
Borrower j’s
debt-service
(iLj + repj) over
their cash flow
(CF j)
None direct
Interest rate is a
spread, increasing
with borrowers’
debt service to cash
flow ratio, added to
the baseline rate
Caiani et al. (2016,
2019)
Firms 5 years No
rlb,t =
r−lb,t−1(1± FN)
Market average
interest rate in
the previous
period (r−lb,t−1)
None
Bank’s capital
ratio influences
the interest rate
by adding
(subtracting) a
stochastic
mark-up (FN)
when it is above
(below) target
Interest rate is
determined on the
basis of the bank’s
current capital ratio
and a common
target capital ratio
Continues in next page
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Table 7 (continued)
Reference(s)
Potential
borrowers
Debt
maturity
Collateral
Interest rate
mechanism
Baseline rate
Borrower-specific
IR component
Bank-specific
IR component
Short description
Reissl (2020b)
Households,
Firms
Implicit Partial
riX = θi(rcb +
defaulti)
Mid-point
interest rate of
central bank’s
corridor (rcb)
None
Default rate of
loans/mortgages
in bank i’s
portfolio.
Mark-up (θi)
stochastically
changes based on
bank’s interest
revenues and its
rate compared to
the sector’s
average
Interest rate is a
mark-up over the
sum of the central
bank rate and the
current default rate
of loans/mortgages
in bank i’s portfolio
Delli Gatti et al.
(2010)
Firms Implicit No
rxz,t =
αA−αz,t +α(ℓx,t)
α None
Borrower x’s
leverage ratio (ℓx,t)
Bank z’s net
worth (Az,t)
Interest rate is
decreasing with the
financial soundness
of the bank and
increasing with the
borrowers’ leverage
ratio
Riccetti et al.
(2013); Russo et al.
(2016)
Households,
Firms
Implicit No
rb,x,t =
rCBt + r̂b,t + rx,t
Central bank
rate (rCB)
Borrower x’s
leverage ratio
Bank’s ability to
lend all possible
funds
stochastically
changes
component r̂b,t
Interest rate is the
sum of three
elements; the policy
rate, a bank-specific
component and a
borrower specific
one
Cardaci (2018) Households
Single- or
120
periods
Yes
rt,b,h =
r¯ + r̂b,t + rt,h
Central bank
rate (r¯)
Borrower h’s total
debt service ratio
(rt,h = µTDS, with
µ > 0)
Bank b’s leverage
ratio
(r̂b,t = ρLBb,t,
with ρ > 0)
Interest rate is the
sum of three
elements; the policy
rate, a bank-specific
component and a
borrower specific
one
Continues in next page
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Table 7 (continued)
Reference(s)
Potential
borrowers
Debt
maturity
Collateral
Interest rate
mechanism
Baseline rate
Borrower-specific
IR component
Bank-specific
IR component
Short description
Gurgone et al.
(2018)
Firms
random,
between 2
and 10
periods
No
rt,h,j =
1+cfh,t
1−ρj,t
− 1
None
The default
probability (ρt,h,j)
is an increasing
function of borrower
j’s leverage rate ,
corrected for the
financial
vulnerability
perceived by bank h
in terms of its own
expected shortfall
Bank’s cost of
funds (cfj,t) i.e.
interest paid on
its liabilities
Each bank charges
an interest rate,
taking into account
their counterparty
risk and their own
cost of funds
Cardaci and
Saraceno (2019)
Households
Single-
period
No
rLt,h =
r¯ + r̂t + rt,h
Central bank
rate (r¯)
Borrower h’s total
debt service ratio
(rt,h = µTDS, with
µ > 0)
System-specific
component;
reflecting the
sensitivity of the
bank to the
overall household
debt-to-GDP
ratio
Interest rate is the
sum of three
elements; the policy
rate, an
economy-wide
component and a
borrower-specific
one
Dawid et al. (2019) Firms 18 No
rbi,t = r
c(1 +
λB · PDbk,t + ǫ
b
t)
Central bank
rate (rc)
Borrower k’s
probability of
default (PDbk,t)
Stochatically
varying
component
(ǫbt ∼ U [0, 1])
proxying
operational costs
Interest rate is an
increasing function
of the credit risk
reflecting the risk
premium that the
bank charges to
more risky
borrowers
Alexandre and Lima
(2020)
Firms 10 No
ri,t = r
B
(
1 +
0.5(lBt )
γ +
0.5(li,t)
γ
)
Central bank
rate (rB)
Borrower i’s total
debt to net worth
ratio (li,t)
Bank’s total loans
over net worth
(lBt )
Interest rate is a
mark-up on the
policy rate,
associated with an
increasing function
of bank’s and
borrowers’ leverage
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B Expectations formation under the Heuristics Switching
Model
The Heuristics Switching Model (HSM) is described in detail in the works of Anufriev and Hommes
(2012a,b) and the subsequent literature. However, a brief description is provided here. It consists
of 3 parts; a pool of forecasting heuristics, a measure of their performance and a heuristic selection
rule.
For a generic variable yt, the forecasting heuristics are the following linear, adaptive or trend-
extrapolating rules:
A weak trend following rule (WTR):
yewtr,t = yt−1 + ωwtr · (yt−1 − yt−2) (12)
A strong trend following rule (STR):
yestr,t = yt−1 + ωstr · (yt−1 − yt−2) (13)
An adaptive expectations rule (ADA):
yeada,t = y
e
t−1 + ωada · (yt−1 − y
e
t−1) (14)
A learning anchoring and adjustment rule (LAA):
yelaa,t =
yavt−1 + yt−1
2
+ (yt−1 − yt−2) (15)
, where yavt−1 =
1
t
∑j=t−1
j=0 yj
The first, second and fourth heuristics (WTR, STR and LAA) are trend-extrapolation rules.
The first two vary only in the strength of the trend-following behaviour (ωstr > ωwtr), while
the last one is a bit more complicated since expectations are extrapolated from an anchor which
takes into account past realized values (Anufriev and Hommes, 2012a,b). The third heuristic is a
simple adaptive rule, where past observations and expectations are combined to form the current
expectation of yt.
The performance of each heuristic i is evaluated according to the following measure:
Ui,t−1 = −(yt−1 − y
e
i,t−1)
2 + ηUi,t−2 (16)
The parameter η ∈ [0, 1] controls how strongly past errors affect households’ choices, i.e. their
memory. If η = 0, past performance is forgotten, whereas for every other value of η ∈ (0, 1] all
past prediction errors are considered, albeit in a decaying manner. Indeed, literature on household
memory and expectations suggests that when households make financial decisions their memories
do persist (Ampudia and Ehrmann, 2017) and can go back around 10-15 years or more before fading
away (Ehrmann and Tzamourani, 2012).
The final element of the HSM is the selection rule which determines the probability ni,t of
heuristic i being selected in each period t:
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ni,t = δni,t−1 + (1− δ)
exp(βUi,t−1)∑4
i=1 exp(βUi,t−1)
(17)
The stochastic choice among the forecasting heuristics depends on their performance and two
behavioural parameters, namely δ and β. The first parameter, δ ∈ [0, 1], represents inertia in
heuristic selection, i.e. households’ tendency to stick to their previous choice. The second parameter,
β ≥ 0, known as “intensity of choice”, reflects how fast households will switch to the best performing
heuristic. The values of the HSM-related parameters are fixed to the ones identified in the original
studies of Anufriev and Hommes (2012a,b) and have been since shown to present excellent fit
properties in various settings (Assenza et al., 2014).
C Calibration of initial DSTI and its evolution
One of the key series that controls the supply of credit is households’ maximum debt-service-to-
income ratio (DSTI). For each credit request it receives, the bank calculates the potential borrower’s
DSTI as the sum of interest payments plus amortisations (assuming that the demanded loan is
granted) over their monthly income. If this figure is below the maximum value accepted by the
bank, then the requested amount is granted. Otherwise, only a fraction of it is offered.
The maximum DSTI is assumed to be set by the bank, reflecting its risk tolerance and is
exogenously injected into the model. However, publicly available data on DSTI are very scarce.
The only available source for such information is the BIS’s debt service ratios statistics. The
database, as of September 2019, covers 32 countries and provides an estimate of DSTI series at an
aggregate level, in quarterly frequency.
This database has two main limitations; it doesn’t cover all countries examined in this study
and, “...it does not necessarily accurately measure [DSTI’s] level relative to what one could obtain
from the correct micro data” (Drehmann et al., 2015, p. 91). The former limitation extends not
only to a country being included, but also to the fact that the reported DSTI series at sector level38
might not represent its sub-components in a sufficient manner. One can reasonably assume that the
two components of total household DSTI, mortgage and consumer credit, follow different paths.39
Therefore, the calibration procedure aims to overcome these limitations.
The first one, is the most difficult to address in the absence of more detailed data. Thus, it is
circumvented in an axiomatic way; it is assumed that the actual DSTI series for consumer credit
in any given country (CY, SI and the UK) must have roughly similar dynamics with some of those
reported in the database. The second one is approached in a brute-force way; a range of initial
DSTI figures is applied on a number of country-specific DSTI growth rates and the resulting path
is fed as an input in the model. The pair of {intitial DSTI, DSTI growth rate path} which yields
the lowest distance and highest synchronisation with the historical series of consumer credit is the
one used throughout the study.
The aforementioned procedure is applied on every country scenario examined in the study.
However, only the results for CY are discussed below. The results for SI and the UK verified the
ones identified in Papadopoulos (2019) and are not shown here due to space considerations. It is
worth mentioning that during the calibration procedure the interest rate setting mechanisms are
38Subscript H indicates that the series reflects the household sector, while P the private, non-financial sector.
39In (Papadopoulos, 2019, p. 61) the author clearly shows that, for the case of the US, housing and consumer
credit DSTIs have indeed very different dynamics.
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switched off and the historical series of lending rates are used instead. This is done to ensure that
every variable which could affect the evolution of credit is as close as possible to the realised data.
Figure 10 presents the evolution of the raw data (left) as well as their interpolated, monthly growth
rates (right) for several country cases.
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Figure 10: Scenarios examined for DSTI’s trajectory calibration in the CY-specific scenario.
The selection of the individual series to be examined in the calibration exercise is based on
their presumed adequacy to reflect the unknown, real-world DSTI in CY. The economy was deeply
affected by the GFC. In fact, the impact was so strong that the government resorted to international
assistance in 2012 and 2013 and the country’s banks were bailed-in in early 2013. Thus, it is
likely that DSTI followed an increasing pattern until about 2008, then exhibited a plateau and
subsequently plummeted after 2013 as both demand and supply froze. An additional element is
that in 201340, policy makers, in response to the financial crisis, imposed limits on the maximum
DSTIs which in all probability must have resulted in a further decline (Central Bank of Cyprus,
2013).
It should be noted that while every scenario shows the previously discussed general pattern, two
stand apart; PTP displays the closest pattern to the expected one before 2014, while HUP is the
one with the sharpest drop after 2014. Thus, a hybrid scenario is created by combining the two
monthly growth rates in January 2015. Figure 11 shows the output of the grid-search procedure
described above, for the case of the CY-specific scenario.
40Effective as of 31 March 2014 and lifted on 1 April 2016.
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Figure 11: Distance and synchronisation measures between artificial and historical series of con-
sumer credit per initial DSTI values for the CY-specific scenario.
The top row in Figure 11 displays the distance and synchronisation between the model-generated
and observed data of consumer credit in (rescaled) levels, while the bottom row in growth rates.
Eight scenarios are examined with initial values of DSTI ranging between 30% to 60% per scenario.
The most prominent feature of Figure 11 is the improvement in performance across the board
for initial DSTI values above 40%. Practically, each scenario’s fit reaches its maximum and does not
increase above that level of DSTI0. Nevertheless, three scenarios outperform the rest. In particular
PTP (filled circles) and ITp (hollow triangles) and the hybrid one (red, dashed line) seem to result
in a better fit than the rest. Among the three, the hybrid one exhibits slightly better performance
hence, it is the one used in the simulation.
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